731R00130024 Proceeding Registry

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Foreign Reaction to Proposed Earth

Satellite Vehicle

There is summarized below fereign reaction to the announcement by the President of plane for an Earth Satellite Vehicle as part of the program of the International Geophysical Year:

- a. Soviet reaction. The White House aphouncement of plans to launch an earth smallite was treated initially in Communist propagands in a manner characteristic of embarrassment or excertainty. Radio Moscow withheld the news for three days before giving a brief account of the project, emitting the President's invitation to share in its results. Satellite radios variously ignored the project, used Meseaw's brief account, or in a few cases attempted to establish priority in the field for the USSR. Subsequently the Seviete have broadcast technical and scientific accounts of earth satellites and of problems involved in space flight. Most of these accounts refer briefly and matter of facily to US plans for earth satellites in connection with IGY.
- b. West European reaction Pactual reporting, sometimes with additional technical background, was predominantly fellowed by most European newspapers and journals. Where present, editorial reaction varied from favorable to unfavorable and cynical. Many newspapers emphasized that the ESV represented another significant step in scientific advancement. A number of editorials saw a relationship between the anneuncement of the ESV and the Geneva Conference on peaceful use of atomic energy, and feel that the launching of the ESV as part

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of a cooperative scientific endeavor further increased the prospects for world peace. Other comments indicated a belief that a new area of East-West rivalry was epened by the possibility of launching an ESV and pointed out possible military implications and uses for the satellite; some comments indicated a fear of uncontrolled scientific advance, as evidenced by the A-bomb, the H-bomb, and new the ESV.

A sampling survey made by USIA in August indicates:

(a) awareness of a plan to launch a satellite had spread to from half to two-thirds of the general public in Great Britain, West Germany, Austria, Italy, France and Belgium. (b) Despite the USSR's rapid fellow-up to the US earth estellite announcement, the US was largely successful in establishing primacy. The US was cited as first announcing the plan by the great bulk of the public in these countries sweets of the development, and by even larger proportions among spinion-leading upper status respondents. (c) Favorable reactions to the satellite project outweigh adverse views on the average, but they do so by no large margin, and considerable proportions register uncertainty as to whether the new development will be used for good or bad purposes.

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Assistant Director
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